The role of government in safety policy for airpotrs since the attacks Essay

The role of political science in safety policy for airpotrs since the attacks of september 11,2001 - Essay Examples well as people in buildings and on the ground are to be protected, terrorists of aviation must be prevented from passing finished credentials checkpoints and gaining access to aircraft.Before September 2001, U.S. General Accounting Offices (GAO) involvement in aviation security was to oversee the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which had responsibility for aircraft safety, all under the security of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Studies conducted by the GAO had consistently demonstrated that there were major weaknesses in aviation security and this had been a problem for a long time. Among the most important aspect of these weaknesses involved drome screening. The persistence was not required to screen checked baggage on domestic flights and proved inadequate in the detection of threats when carry-on bags or screening passengers prior to their board ing aircraft. It also provided insufficient security for air calling control computer systems and inadequate means for restricting access to secure areas at airports and facilities. The Congress and the governance have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for emigration security, transferring them to the new Department of Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to promote security without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November 2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security, has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges.Prior to 9/11, airline screeners were engage by the airlines or airports directly. They frequently did not detect terrorist material located either on the passengers or in their carry-on baggage. According to a GAO report in June 2000, a study of screeners conducted in 1987 discovered that airport screeners failed to observe 20 percent of the potentially hazardous items that the FAA used in its tests. Data collected